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IN AID OF REMOVAL: DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON 
IMMIGRA TION DETENTION 
David Cole* 
On October 31,2001, Ibrahim Turkmen was ready to go. A Muslim Imam 
and citizen of Turkey, he had come to the United States a year earlier on a six-
month tourist visa, but had found work here in a gas station and for a 
construction company, and had overstayed his visa in order to send money 
back to his family in Turkey.' On October 18, 2001, FBI agents arrested Mr. 
Turkmen at his home, informally accused him of being associated with Osama 
bin Laden-a charge he denies and that was never formally advanced-and 
placed him in immigration proceedings for overstaying his visa. Mr. Turkmen 
agreed to leave the country, and an immigration judge granted him "voluntary 
departure," a form of relief that allows aliens to leave the country without 
incurring the penalties associated with a final deportation order. Two days 
later, a friend purchased a plane ticket to Turkey for Mr. Turkmen and brought 
it to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) office in Newark, New 
Jersey. In ordinary times, he would have been back in Turkey in a matter of 
days. 
But these are not ordinary times, and the INS would not let Mr. Turkmen 
go. He remained in detention for another three and one-half months, not 
because the INS faced any problems in effecting his removal, and not because 
the government had probable cause to believe that Mr. Turkmen had been 
involved in any criminal activity, but simply because the FBI had not yet 
"cleared" Mr. Turkmen in its investigation of the terrorist attacks of September 
11. On February 25, 2002, when the FBI finally cleared Mr. Turkmen of any 
ties to terrorism or the events of September 11, the INS allowed him to leave. 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. J.D., (1984); B.A., (1980), Yale University. 
Jeffrey Leasure provided excellent research assistance. 
I The following account of the detention of Mr. Turkmen and Mr. Saffi is drawn from the complaint in 
their class action suit against the U.S. government. Class Action Complaint and Demand For Jury Trial, 
Turkmen v. Ashcroft (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. CV-02-307), at http://news.corporate.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsl 
terrorismlturkmenash41702cmp.pdf. Through the Center for Constitutional Rights, I am co-counsel for 
plaintiffs in this lawsuit. 
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Mr. Turkmen was not alone. Asif-ur-Rehman Saffi, a French citizen and 
native of Pakistan also detained in connection with the September 11 
investigation, was ordered deported on October 17, 2001, but remained in INS 
custody for four-and-one-half more months, and was actually deported only 
after the FBI had cleared him as well. On February 18, 2002, the New York 
Times reported that as of that date, 87 noncitizens were in the same situation, 
having received voluntary departure or final deportation orders, but kept 
locked up and barred from leaving because the FBI was still investigating 
them.2 
Were Mr. Turkmen or Mr. Saffi U.S. citizens, there would have been no 
basis for their detention. They were never charged with any crimes and were 
not shown to pose any danger to the community or flight risk. Moreover, once 
they were ready and willing to leave the country, there was not even any 
arguable immigration purpose for detaining them, as their custody was not 
necessary to effectuate their removal. They were held, in essence, "for 
investigation." Yet beyond the narrow confines of the brief stop-and-frisk 
authorized in Terry v. Ohio,3 the Constitution knows no place for "in-
vestigative detention." As the United States Supreme Court has recently 
reminded us, preventive detention is a narrowly carved exception to the 
general due process rule that persons may not be deprived of their liberty 
absent a criminal conviction.4 
The detention of aliens for months beyond the time necessary to effectuate 
their removal is just one component of a wide-ranging preventive detention 
campaign undertaken by the Department of Justice in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, in which the government has aggressively used 
immigration authority to implement a broad strategy of preventive detention 
where other civil or criminal law authority would not permit custody. By a 
conservative estimate, the government has arrested between 1500 and 2000 
persons since September 11 in connection with the investigation of the terrorist 
2 Christopher Drew & Judith Miller, Though Not Linked to Terrorism, Many Detainees Cannot Go 
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at A I (reporting that Justice Department has blocked departure of 87 
mostly Arab or Muslim noncitizens who have received voluntary deportation or removal orders "[w]hile 
investigators comb through information pouring in from overseas to ensure that they have no ties to 
terrorism"). 
3 392 U.S. 1,24 (1968) (upholding brief investigative detention for purposes of confirming or dispelling 
suspicion upon reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot). 
4 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (limiting detention of deportable aliens to six months 
where there is no significant likelihood of their deportation in the reasonably foreseeable future because the 
country to which they have been ordered deported will not admit them). 
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crimes committed that day.s Yet as of November 2002, more than one year 
into the September 11 investigation, not a single person arrested in the 
preventive detention campaign had been charged with any involvement in the 
September 11 attacks. (The only person so charged, Zaccarias Moussawi, was 
arrested before September 11.) Only four detained individuals have been 
charged with any terrorist-related crime.6 The vast majority have, like Mr. 
Turkmen and Mr. Saffi, been "cleared" by the FBI of any involvement in the 
September 11 attacks or any terrorist activity of any kind. Thus, virtually all of 
the 1500-2000 persons detained in the government's investigation of 
September 11 have turned out to be innocent of any involvement in terrorism. 
The majority of the detainees have been held on immigration charges, again 
like Mr. Turkmen and Mr. Saffi. In some cases, the charges are highly 
technical. One man, Ali Maqtari, a lawful permanent resident alien, was held 
for a month on the charge that he had been out of lawful status for ten days 
while adjusting his status from visitor to permanent resident. It is likely that 
the INS has never deported anyone on such a charge; the purpose of his 
detention was not to enforce the immigration laws, but to detain him while the 
FBI interrogated and investigated him. When the FBI cleared him, he was 
released, and his charges were conditionally dropped pending a showing that 
his marriage was "genuine.,,7 
Those held on immigration charges have been detained and tried entirely in 
secret. Pursuant to a directive from the Attorney General, their cases are not 
listed on any public docket, and the immigration judges presiding have been 
instructed to neither confirm nor deny that the case exists if asked. Every 
aspect of the proceedings, no matter how routine, is closed to the public, to the 
press, and even to family members.s And pursuant to an immigration 
5 An exact number is.not available, because on November 5,2001, when the Justice Department's daily 
announced running tally was 1147, the Administration responded to criticism about the large number of 
detainees by abruptly halting its practice of disclosing how many had been detained. It has not released a total 
figure since that date. But if 1147 were detained in the first seven weeks of the investigation, even if the rate 
of detainees dropped by 50-75 percent in the subsequent year, the total number would conservatively be in the 
1500-2000 range as of November 2002. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 960 (2002). 
6 Danny Hakim, 4 Are Charged with Belonging to a Terror Cell, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, at Al 
(reporting that four men were charged with supporting terrorism in the Detroit area, three of whom had been 
detained after September II, and that another detained man, Earnest James Ujaama, had been indicted in 
Seattle for supporting terrorism). 
7 All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 4, 200 I). 
8 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (declaring this policy unconstitutional as 
applied to detained alien whose identity was widely publicized); North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 2002 
U.S. App. LEXIS 21032 (3d Cir. Oct. 8,2002) (upholding, 2-1, the closure of immigration proceedings). I am 
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regulation issued in October 2001, the INS officials who prosecute deportation 
cases can effectively override immigration judges who rule that an alien should 
be released on bond pending his deportation proceedings.9 The rule gives INS 
prosecutors an automatic stay upon filing an appeal from such an order, 
without any requirement that they show that their appeal is likely to succeed, 
or that there is a danger of irreparable harm. 
When the government is criticized for this use of immigration authority, its 
defenders often respond that those held on immigration charges are unlawfully 
here, and as illegal aliens, they are subject to detention. IO That view is 
apparently widely held in Congress, as in recent years it has imposed 
mandatory detention on various categories of aliens. In 1996, for example, 
Congress mandated detention of all aliens charged with having committed 
"aggravated felonies," a term of art in immigration law that sweeps far more 
broadly than it sounds, and encompasses even some misdemeanors. II The 
same year, Congress mandated detention of at least some aliens subject to final 
orders of deportation. 12 And the INS takes the view that it can detain arriving 
aliens in order to send a message to others who might be considering coming 
to the United States; it recently adopted a policy of detaining all Haitian 
applicants for asylum who arrived in the United States by boat, not because 
these aliens were considered flight risks or dangerous, but in order to deter 
other Haitians from risking dangerous boat rides to the United States. 13 
Immigration detention is by definition "preventive" because the INS has no 
authority to detain for punitive purposes. Punitive detention may be imposed 
only pursuant to the criminal law. 14 But precisely because preventive 
detention involves depriving individuals of their physical liberty without an 
adjudication of criminal gUilt, its use is strictly circumscribed by due process 
constraints. Most fundamentally, preventive detention may not be imposed 
where there is nothing to prevent. Thus, in the criminal setting, bail may be 
co·counsel for plaintiffs in the latter case. and co-counsel for Rabih Haddad in a federal action related to the 
Detroit Free Press case. Haddad v. Ashcroft, 2002 WL 31096692 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 17.2002). 
9 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(4)(i)(2) (2002). 
10 See, e.g .• Nightline (ABC News television broadcast, Oct. I, 200 I) (remarks of Beth Wilkinson). 
II 8 U.S.C. § I 227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000); 8 U.S.c. § IIOI(a)(43) (defining "aggravated felony"). 
12 8 U.S.c. § 1226(c)(I). 
13 Jeanty v. Bulger, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1381-82 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
14 The INS has no authority to detain aliens for any purposes other than prevention. Outside a criminal 
process, punitive detention violates due process. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 694-95 (2001); Wong 
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 241 (1896) (holding unconstitutional INS imposition of hard labor on 
deportable aliens, reasoning that immigration authority cannot be exercised for punitive purposes). 
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denied only if the defendant poses either a risk of flight or a danger to the 
. 15 
commUnIty. 
Similarly, in the immigration setting, preventive detention should be 
constitutionally permissible only where necessary in aid of removal. The only 
legitimate purpose of immigration proceedings is to remove those aliens who 
do not have a legal basis for remaining here. If the alien poses a flight risk, his 
detention may be necessary to ensure that he will be around if and when a final 
removal order is effective. If the alien poses a danger to the community, his 
detention may be necessary to protect the community while his legal status in 
the United States is resolved. But where an alien poses neither a danger nor a 
flight risk, his removal may be effectuated without detention, and detention 
therefore serves no legitimate government purpose. In such circumstances, 
detention is unconstitutional. 
So understood, due process places significant constraints on the govern-
ment's power to detain individuals pursuant to immigration authority. Because 
the immigration power cannot be used punitively, the government may not 
take a noncitizen's liberty without an individualized showing that the person 
poses either a danger to the community or a risk of flight. Yet as the examples 
cited above illustrate, immigration law in recent years has developed as if it 
were immune from these due process limitations. This is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, but a widespread one. The Supreme Court has already had one 
occasion to review it, and a second opportunity is currently pending. In 
Zadvydas v. Davis,16 the Court in 2001 reaffIrmed that at least with respect to 
aliens living inside the United States, substantive due process applies with full 
force to immigration detention. The Court strained to read a statute that 
appeared to authorize indefinite detention of aliens to contain a presumptive 
six-month limit, precisely to avoid the substantive due process concerns that 
would be presented were the statute read more broadly. And in Demore v. 
Kim,17 the Court has agreed to review the constitutionality of the provision 
imposing mandatory detention on criminal aliens while their removal 
proceedings are pending. Several lawsuits have challenged the INS's use of 
immigration detention in connection with the investigation of the September 
15 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752-53 (1987). 
16 533 U.S. at 678. 
17 122 S. Ct. 2696 (2002). 
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11 attacks. 18 And a district court has declared unconstitutional the "automatic 
stay" provision promulgated to facilitate the preventive detention campaign 
that immediately followed the attacks. 19 
In this Article, I seek to demonstrate the radical consequences that taking 
due process seriously would have for immigration detention as currently 
practiced. Part I lays out the general principles that apply to civil preventive 
detention, which establish that substantive due process is violated without an 
individualized showing after a fair adversarial hearing that there is something 
to prevent, namely danger to the community or flight. Part II applies this 
general framework to immigration detention. It first demonstrates, by a review 
of Supreme Court decisions, that the Court has applied the same due process 
principles to immigration detention that it has to other forms of civil detention; 
in other words, this is not a subject on which immigration exceptionalism, or 
the plenary power doctrine, has played much of a role. Second, I apply these 
general principles to several immigration law developments since 1996, 
illustrating that significant aspects of the INS's current detention policy and 
practice violate due process. Finally, I take up the issue of detention of 
entering aliens, and argue that cases holding that due process does not limit 
entering aliens' detention are predicated on an erroneous conflation of the 
decision to exclude and the decision to detain. 
I. DUE PROCESS AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
With the exception of the power to make war and to impose capital 
punishment, few state actions are more serious than locking up a human being. 
The potential for such authority to be abused led the Constitution's Framers to 
include two critical protections-due process and habeas corpus. Together, the 
Due Process Clause and the Suspension Clause ensure that the authority to 
detain must be exercised according to law, and must be subject to judicial 
review. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[fJreedom from imprisonment-
from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies 
at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.,,20 The right 
to liberty is not absolute, but can be restricted only in accordance with both 
18 Class Action Complaint and Demand For Jury Trial. Turkmen v. Ashcroft (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. CV-
02-307), at http://news.coi-porate.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/turkmenash41702cmp.pdf. See also supra 
note 8. 
19 Almonte-Vargas v. Elwood, 2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 12387, at *19 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002). 
20 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 
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procedural and substantive due process.2l Accordingly, when the government 
takes an individual into custody, it must do so pursuant to fair procedures that 
afford adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, and it must 
have a legitimate substantive reason for the detention. The writ of habeas 
corpus in tum ensures that individuals will have recourse to a court to 
challenge the legality of their detention.22 
The task of defining what substantive reasons warrant depriving a person of 
his liberty is not straightforward, and the Due Process Clause by its own terms 
provides no express guidance on the subject. As in other due process areas, 
history, tradition, precedent, and principle may guide the development of the 
jurisprudence. But compared to the disputes that have surrounded the 
extension of substantive due process to other claimed interests,23 the Supreme 
Court's approach to the issue of physical custody has been relatively 
noncontroversial. While there have been disagreements around the edges,24 
certain principles have garnered nearly unanimous consent. Foremost among 
them is the neo-Kantian notion that the government cannot lock up people 
without having a go~d reason, specific to the individual, for doing so. Outside 
of wartime, no Justice on the Court has even argued for civil detention in the 
21 [d.; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.s. 346, 356 (1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 
(1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). 
22 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served 
as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have 
been strongest."); see also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The historic 
purpose of the writ [of habeas corpus] has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial 
trial."). The roots of the right not to be detained unlawfully extend back beyond the Constitution. William 
Blackstone characterizes as an absolute right "the personal liberty of individuals ... without imprisonment or 
restraint, unless by due course of law," I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130, and states that "to 
refuse or delay to bail any person bailable, is an offence against the liberty of the subject ... by the common 
law; as well as by ... statute ... and the habeas corpus act." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *294. In 
England and in the colonies prior to 1789 the writ of habeas corpus was available to non-enemy aliens seeking 
to challenge their detention. SI. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301-02. 
23 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (finding substantive due process protects right 
to contract and invalidates protective labor legislation for bakers); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937) (overruling Lochner); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (finding substantive due process 
protects right to terminate pregnancy); Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992) (relying on 
"reasoned elaboration" of precedent and stare decisis to uphold Roe in part, reaffirming that substantive due 
process protects women's right to terminate her pregnancy); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 
(1986) (relying on tradition and history of condemnation of homosexual conduct to reject substantive due 
process claim); id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (reasoning from precedent to find a right to adult 
consensual sex); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (rejecting substantive due process 
challenge to Washington law banning assisted suicide). 
24 See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 415 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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absence of an individualized finding that the detention is necessary to protect 
against a distinct danger posed by the individual sought to be detained. 
In a recent decision surveying the landscape, the Supreme Court stated that 
"government detention violates th[e Due Process] Clause" unless it is imposed 
as punishment in a criminal proceeding conforming to the rigorous procedures 
constitutionally required for such proceedings, or "in certain special and 
'narrow' non-punitive 'circumstances.",25 Non-punitive, or preventive, 
detention is permissible only where an individual (1) is either in criminal or 
immigration ~roceedings and has been shown to be a danger to the community 
or flight risk; 6 (2) is dangerous because of a "harm-threatening mental illness" 
that impairs his ability to control his dangerousness;27 or (3) is an enemy alien 
during a declared war.28 With the exception of the last category, implicit in all 
of the Court's decisions regarding detention is the notion that the justification 
for detention must be particularized to the individual. Just as we cannot 
impose criminal sanctions on individuals absent a determination of individual 
culpability,29 so too we cannot lock up a person absent a showing that there is a 
demonstrated need to lock up that specific person. 
For example, in upholding the Bail Reform Act against a facial due process 
challenge, the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno3o emphasized that the 
statute authorized only a limited period of pretrial detention, and only pursuant 
25 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 
26 Id. at 688. See also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752-53; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1952). 
27 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; accord Crane, 534 U.S. at 412-13; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 
(1997). 
28 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171-73 (1948) (upholding suspicionless detention of "enemy 
aliens" during a declared war). The Court also notoriously upheld the internment of citizens and noncitizens 
of Japanese descent during World War II, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-19 (1944), but that 
widely criticized decision is of dubious validity today. Eight of the nine sitting Justices have explicitly 
criticized the decision; Justice Scalia has compared it to the Dred Scott case. See Cole, supra note 5, at 993 
n.165 (citing cases). 
Another setting in which the government engages in preventive detention is where an individual has 
testimony material to a criminal proceeding and is likely to abscond if served with a subpoena. 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3144 (2000). The Supreme Court has never opined on the constitutionality of that statute, but lower courts 
have generally upheld it. One court has interpreted the statute as limited to holding witnesses to testify in 
criminal trials, and held that it does not extend to testimony for grand jury proceedings, in part based on 
constitutional concerns. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). But other 
courts have disagreed with that conclusion. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971); In re 
Application of United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In any 
event, no court has questioned the validity of detaining material witnesses for testimony in a criminal trial. 
29 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961) (finding that due process requires showing of 
individual culpability for criminal sanction). 
30 481 U.S. at 739. 
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to individualized findings in a fair hearing?l The Court first determined that 
the denial of bail to dangerous arrestees did not constitute punishment, for it 
served a legitimate nonpunitive interest in protecting the community, and was 
not excessive in light of that interest.32 Had the detention been punitive, the 
Court's analysis implies, it would have been unconstitutional, for punitive 
detention may be imposed only pursuant to a criminal conviction.33 
The Court's determination that the denial of bail is not punitive, however, 
was only the beginning of its due process inquiry. The Court went on to hold 
that the Bail Reform Act's imposition of civil nonpunitive detention satisfied 
substantive due process because it served a "legitimate and compelling" 
interest,34 applied only to "a specific category of extremely serious offenses,,,35 
and required both a showing of probable cause for arrest and clear and 
convincing evidence, established in a "full-blown adversary hearing," that "no 
conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any 
person.,,36 
Finally, the Court held that the Act's "extensive safeguards" satisfied 
procedural due process.37 The Court emphasized that the safeguards included 
the fact that the defendant has the rights to counsel, to testify, to proffer 
evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses; that the government must prove its 
case by clear and convincing evidence; and that an independent judge guided 
by "statutorily enumerated factors" must issue a written decision subject to 
"immediate appellate review.,,38 
Each of these holdings necessarily implies that civil detention may be 
imposed only where there has been at a minimum an individualized showing of 
necessity for detention in a fair adversarial hearing. If detention were imposed 
without such a showing, it would be excessive in light of the legitimate 
purposes of detention, and would therefore constitute punishment and violate 
31 [d. at 739. See also id. at 750-52. 
32 [d. at 747. 
33 Foucha v. Louisiana. 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (invalidating statute permitting civil commitment based 
on finding of dangerousness alone, reasoning that "[a)s Foucha was not convicted, he may not be punished"); 
see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (invalidating statute that imposed 
imprisonment at hard labor on deportable aliens because it imposed punishment without a criminal 
conviction). 
34 Salerno. 481 U.S. at 749. 
35 [d. at 750. 
36 [d. 
37 [d. at 752. 
38 Id. at 751-52. 
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substantive due process.39 And without procedural safeguards designed to give 
the individual a meaningful opportunity to defend himself, civil detention 
would violate procedural due process. Thus, each prong of the Salerno 
analysis implies that, at a minimum, detention can be imposed only where 
there is a fair individualized determination that the detained individual needs to 
be detained, either because he poses a danger to others or a risk of flight. 
This conclusion is further supported by the civil commitment cases. The 
Court has upheld civil commitment where an individual is found, after a fair 
adversarial proceeding, to be a danger to himself or others and to have a 
mental illness or abnormality that makes it "difficult, if not impossible, for the 
[dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior.,,40 In its most recent 
decision, Kansas v. Crane, the Court emphasized that the latter showing, 
namely that the mental abnormality makes it difficult to control the 
individual's dangerous behavior, is essential "lest 'civil commitment' become 
a 'mechanism for retribution or general deterrence' -functions properly those 
of criminal law, not civil commitment."'" 
The notion that civil commitment cannot serve the ends of "general 
deterrence" is an important corollary to the principle that civil detention 
demands an individualized showing of need. General deterrence might well 
39 The Court has been less than clear about the relation between the inquiry into whether a detention 
statute is "punitive" and the subsequent substantive due process inquiry, in which it weighs the government's 
interest against the individual's interest and asks whether the statute is sufficiently tailored to satisfy due 
process. It is likely that detention in the absence of any individualized justification for the detention would 
violate substantive due process because it would serve none of the recognized legitimate purposes of 
preventive detention, and would also be deemed "punitive" because in that setting detention would be 
"excessive" in light of the government's legitimate nonpunitive purposes. But it is not necessarily the case 
that these inquiries will always overlap. A detention statute might be invalid because it was designed to be 
punitive, even though a similar statute designed to serve nonpunitive purposes might be constitutional. And a 
detention statute that was concededly nonpunitive in design might nonetheless violate substantive due process 
under the balancing approach used in Salerno. 
40 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (\997)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
41 [d. To the same effect, the Cralle Court stated that this requirement was designed "to distinguish the 
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil 
commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case." [d. Similarly, 
in Kallsas v. Helldricks, 521 U.S. at 358, the Court explained that the requirement of a harm-threatening 
mental illness "servels] to limit involuntary civil commitment to those who suffer from a volitional impairment 
rendering them dangerous beyond their control." And in Foucha v. Louisialla, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), the Court 
invalidated a Louisiana statute that authorized civil commitment on a finding of dangerousness without any 
finding of mental illness, stressing that "our present system ... with only narrow exceptions and aside from 
permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
to have violated a criminal law." 504 U.S. at 83. 
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justify detention without individualized showings of need, for it might be 
sufficient for the government to maintain that the detention of a whole 
category of persons will have a general deterrent effect, without having to 
show that each individual's detention is in fact necessary for reasons specific 
to that individual. But if punishment, retribution, and general deterrence are 
off limits, then the only conceivable legitimate purposes for preventive 
detention are protection of the community from dangerous persons and 
avoiding flight where criminal or immigration proceedings are pending. And 
those purposes are furthered by detention only when individuals actually pose 
a risk of danger or flight. 
The only exception to the due process insistence on individualized 
showings of need arises in war time. Under the Enemy Aliens Act, enacted in 
1798, the President is authorized to detain, deport, or otherwise restrict the 
liberty of any person over fourteen years of age who is a citizen of the country 
with which we are at war.42 The Surreme Court upheld it in 1948, in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II.4 In Ludecke v. Watkins, a 5-4 majority 
offered little analysis for its conclusion, other than to note that the law was 
"almost as old as the Constitution, and it would savQLpf doctrinaire audacity 
now to find the statute offensive to some emanation of the Bill of Rights.'M 
But of course the law invalidated in Marbury v. Madison45 was also "almost as 
old as the Constitution," but that did not mean that it was constitutionally valid. 
Four justices vehemently dissented in Ludecke, three joining an opinion 
claiming that deportation of aliens, during peace or wartime, requires a hearing 
conforming to due process.46 Interestingly, the Supreme Court's most recent 
characterization of Ludecke describes it as holding that "in times of war or 
insurrection, when society's interest is at its peak, the Government may detain 
individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous,'.47 a description 
that at least arguably implies the need for some individualized finding. 
However, the point of the Enemy Aliens Act is that the President need make no 
individualized finding of danger or suspicion whatsoever, and could if he so 
chose detain all foreign nationals over fourteen from the country we are 
fighting, without regard to their dangerousness. 
42 50 U.S.c. § 21 (1994). 
43 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171-73 (1948). 
44 Id. at 17l. 
45 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, (1803). 
46 Id. at 184 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Black also dissented, but on the ground that the enemy 
alien power did not survive the cessation of hostilities. /d. at 173 (Black, J., dissenting). 
47 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). 
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There is some reason to doubt whether Ludecke remains good law. The 
government employed strikingly similar reasoning in Korematsu, which is now 
roundly criticized, and not merely because it upheld the internment of citizens 
of Japanese descent. And Ludecke precedes the development of the Court's 
due process jurisprudence regarding preventive detention. Every case since 
that time has required as an irreducible minimum some individualized showing 
of need for detention, and perhaps such a showing would now be required in a 
declared war as well. But as we have not fought a declared war since World 
War II, the statute has not been invoked in the last half century, and thus its 
continuing validity has not been confronted. In any event, even if the Court 
were to reaffirm Ludecke, its reasoning would undoubtedly be confined to the 
unique setting of a declared war. The Court has been careful to note that 
Ludecke should be confined to the situation of "enemy aliens" during wartime, 
and should not be extended to general immigration matters not involving 
. d' . 48 enenues unng wartime. 
Thus, with the exception of enemy aliens during wartime, the Supreme 
Court has upheld civil detention only where it is justified by an individualized 
showing of need after a full and fair adversarial hearing. This principle is so 
basic that it brooks virtually no dissent. Yet as will be shown in Part II, recent 
immigration statutes, regulations, and practices suggest that in the immigration 
setting we have lost sight of these very basic principles. It is time to return 
immigration detention to the strictly preventive purposes to which it is 
constitutionally limited. 
II. IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS 
A. General Principles 
The fact that the Constitution limits the imposition of custody in the bail 
and civil commitment settings does not necessarily mean that it constrains 
immigration detention to the same extent. The Supreme Court has frequently 
allowed the federal government to take actions against immigrants that it could 
not take against citizens, reasoning that the immigration power is an inherent 
aspect of sovereignty and that, therefore, Congress has "plenary power" over 
immigration.49 But while immigration exceptionalism is well-documented, the 
48 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,772 (1950). 
49 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) (finding that power to exclude aliens is 
"inherent in sovereignty ... a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches"); Fong Yue Ting v. 
HeinOnline -- 51 Emory L.J. 1015 2002
2(02) DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON IMMIGRATION DETENTION 1015 
Supreme Court's approach to detention of immigrants residing in the United 
States has generally been consistent with the basic due process principles 
articulated in Part I. The Court has treated preventive detention in the 
immigration context much as it has treated other forms of civil detention. As 
in the criminal setting, the Court has permitted preventive detention in 
immigration proceedings only where there is an individualized evidentiary 
showing of need for the detention.5o As in other civil settings, the Court has 
proscribed the punitive use of detention absent a criminal conviction.51 The 
only exception concerns aliens seeking to enter the United States, whom the 
Court has treated as having no constitutional right to object to the procedures 
utilized to determine their admissibility.52 And when the Court recently 
addressed an immigration detention issue, it dismissed the government's 
"plenary power" arguments.53 The Court has long restricted plenary power 
deference to the substantive criteria governing admission and expulsion, and 
has insisted that the procedures Congress employs to carry out removal of 
persons from the United States must satisfy due process.54 
The notion that ordinary due rrocess principles apply to immigration 
detention dates back to the late 19t century. Wong Wing v. United States55 
involved a challenge to a federal statute designed to exclude and expel Chinese 
immigrants. In prior decisions involving the same statute, the Court had 
upheld Congress's power to exclude and expel aliens solely because they were 
from China, to exclude aliens solely through executive action without judicial 
review, and to require that Chinese residents prove their bona fides here with 
the testimony of a "credible white witness.,,56 These decisions inaugurated the 
so-called "plenary power" doctrine, which provides that the immigration 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706-07 (1893); see generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002); STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, 
IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY 177-222 (1987). 
50 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.s. 678, 699 (2001); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952). 
51 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896). 
52 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rei. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). I address this exception in Part 
II.B.5, infra. 
53 Zadvydas, 533 U.s. at 695. 
54 See. e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903) (noting that deportation procedures must 
satisfy due process). 
55 163 U.S. at 228. 
56 Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895) (upholding Congress's power to exclude aliens 
without judicial review); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding deportation of 
Chinese immigrants and "one credible white witness" requirement); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 
U.S. 581 (1889) (commonly known as The Chinese Exclusion Case) (upholding Congress's power to exclude 
on the basis of Chinese origin). 
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power is in large measure immune from constitutional constraint.57 That 
doctrine has been limited in recent years, and it is far from clear that a Chinese 
exclusion law would be upheld today, much less a "one white witness" rule. 
But the "plenary power" doctrine was at its height in the late 19th century. 
Yet at the same time, in Wong Wing the Court for the first time in its 
history declared an immigration statute unconstitutional. The statute imposed 
imprisonment at hard labor on Chinese aliens found in an administrative 
proceeding to be unlawfully present in the United States. 58 Without 
questioning its earlier decisions that Congress has broad plenary power to set 
conditions on foreign citizens' entry into and continued residence in the 
country, the Court unanimously held that imprisonment at hard labor was a 
punitive sanction that required adherence to the constitutional processes that 
attend criminal convictions, including indictment, trial by jury, and the like. 
The Court held that the statute violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 
specifically including the due process clause.59 In doing so, the Court took 
care to distinguish civil detention in aid of deportation, which it compared to 
detention without bail pending a criminal trial and would generally be valid, 
from detention or confiscation of property imposed as punishment, which it 
deemed invalid absent a "judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused.,,60 
Thus, at the very height of deference to plenary immigration power, the Court 
in Wong Wing applied to immigration detention the same principle that it has 
subsequently applied in other civil detention cases: an absolute prohibition of 
the use of civil detention for punitive ends. 
The preventive detention presaged by Wong Wing's dicta was expressly 
upheld in 1952 in Carlson v. Landon.6J In that case, four noncitizens facing 
deportation for their active membership in the Communist Party claimed that 
due process forbade their detention pending deportation absent evidence that 
57 See, e.g .• Fong Yue Ting. 149 U.S. at 707 ("The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who 
have not been naturalized ... rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified. as the right to 
prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country."). 
58 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1896). 
59 /d. at 237-38. 
60 ld. at 237. Regarding civil detention, the Court stated: 
We think it clear that detention, or temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to give 
effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would be valid. Proceedings to 
exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry 
into their true character and while arrangements were being made for their deportation. 
[d. at 235. 
61 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
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they posed a risk of flight. The INS had not found them to be flight risks but to 
pose a danger to national security. By a 5-4 vote, the Court rejected the aliens' 
contentions, ruling that preventive detention is also permissible where there is 
evidence that an alien in pending proceedings may pose a danger to the 
community if released. As the Court put it, "[tJhere is no denial of ... due 
process ... where there is reasonable apprehension of hurt from aliens charged 
with a philosophy of violence against this Government.,,62 The dissenters 
strongly questioned whether the record in fact supported a finding that the 
aliens posed any real danger, as the government had shown little more than 
that they were active members of the Communist Party. But while the 
majority certainly took a very generous view of the government's evidentiary 
showing, its legal holding is consistent with that of Salerno some thirty years 
later-just as due process permits the detention of persons facing criminal 
charges where there is evidence that they would pose a danger if released 
during the pendency of the proceedings, so due process permits preventive 
detention of aliens on those grounds in immigration proceedings. Thus, while 
Carlson, like Wong Wing, pre-dates the modern due process jurisprudence on 
civil detention, it is consistent with that jurisprudence insofar as it permits 
preventive detention only upon a showing that there is something-danger to 
the community or flight-to prevent. 63 
The Court's most recent foray into the question of immigration detention, 
Zadvydas v. Davis,64 further confirms that due process principles apply with 
equal force to immigration and other civil detention. Zadvydas addressed the 
government's power to detain aliens who had been finally ordered deported 
(and had exhausted all appeals), but who could not be deported because no 
country would accept them. Many of these aliens, known in immigration 
circles as "lifers," faced indefinite detention, either because their country of 
origin refused to take them back, or because they were stateless and had no 
right to return to any country. They argued that their indefinite detention, 
where they could not be deported, served no legitimate governmental purpose, 
and therefore violated substantive due process. If immigration detention is 
designed to hold aliens where necessary in order to assure their removal from 
62 [d. at 542. 
63 The Supreme Court also upheld preventive detention of alien juveniles in Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 
(1993), but in doing so it relied on the fact that juveniles lack a full-fledged liberty interest because they are 
"always in some form of custody," id. at 302. and that they had a "right to a hearing before an immigration 
judge" on their custody, id. at 309. 
64 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
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the country, once they cannot be removed the immigration purpose for the 
detention drops out. 
The government responded by arguing that aliens who have been finally 
ordered deported are in a fundamentally different posture from other aliens in 
the United States. The government argued that the deportation order 
extinguished any legitimate right that they might have had to be at liberty in 
the United States, and that therefore their indefinite detention posed no due 
process concerns.65 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had 
essentially agreed. It reasoned that aliens finally ordered removed were in an 
analogous posture, for constitutional purposes, to aliens seeking initial entry. 
Both had no right to claim that they should be allowed into the United States, 
and therefore, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, no constitutional rights.66 
The Supreme Court reversed. Finding that due process protects all aliens in 
the United States, even those here unlawfully and under final orders of 
deportation, the Court concluded that serious constitutional questions would be 
raised were the immigration law interpreted to authorize indefinite detention of 
aliens in Zadvydas's shoes.67 To avoid those constitutional concerns, the Court 
read into the statute a presumptive six-month limit on detention of deportable 
aliens, ruling that if after six months there is no significant likelihood of 
removal in the foreseeable future, the alien must be released.68 While the 
decision thus technically rests on statutory grounds, its strained statutory 
interpretation is plainly driven by constitutional concerns.69 
In its discussion of the constitutional concerns presented, the Court applied 
to immigration detention the due process principles generated in civil detention 
cases outside the immigration context, without any suggestion that a different 
due process analysis should apply. Thus, the Court wrote: 
65 Brief for the Respondent at 35-36, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.s. 678 (2001) (No. 99-7791). 
66 Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279. 289 (5th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit disagreed, ruling in a 
case that the Supreme Court considered in conjunction with Zadvydas that serious constitutional concerns 
would be raised by interpreting the immigration law to permit indefinite detention, and therefore read the 
statute to authorize detention for only a "reasonable time" beyond the initial 90-day period statutorily 
authorized for removal. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 830-31 (9th Cir. 2000). 
67 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94. 
6R Id. at 701. 
69 The statute itself nowhere contains a six-month limit on detention. As dissenting Justice Kennedy 
maintained, not without reason, the Court "interpret[ed the] statute in obvious disregard of congressional intent 
[and] curled] the resulting gap by writing a statutory amendment of its own .... " Id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). That the Court strained so mightily only underscores the depth of its constitutional concerns. 
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A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a 
serious constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause forbids the Government to "depriv[e)" any "person ... of ... 
liberty . . . without due process of law." Freedom from 
imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or other forms 
of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause 
protects. See Foucha v. Lousiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). And this 
Court has said that government detention violates that Clause unless 
the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate 
procedural protections, see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
746 (1987), or, in certain special and "narrow" non-punitive 
"circumstances," Foucha, supra at 80, where a special justification, 
such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the "individual's 
constitutionally protected interest in avoidin~ physical restraint." 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997). 0 
1019 
As the internal citations in this passage illustrate, immigration detention is not 
exceptional, but rather a form of civil detention subject to the same due process 
rules that apply to civil detention elsewhere. 
The Court went on to discuss the two regulatory interests asserted by the 
government for detaining deportable aliens: "'ensuring the appearance of 
aliens at future immigration proceedings' and 'preventing danger to the 
community.",71 It dismissed the former interest as "weak or nonexistent where 
removal seems a remote possibility at best." It conceded that the interest in 
protecting the community continues, but noted that the Court has permitted 
detention of persons based on dangerousness "only when limited to specially 
dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections," again 
citing the civil commitment cases.72 The immigration detention provision, 
however, is not so limited, but applies to all deportable aliens, and contains 
few procedural protections.73 The Court rejected the government's and the 
Fifth Circuit's analogy to entering aliens, reasoning that the Court had long 
drawn a sharp constitutional distinction between aliens outside our borders and 
those who are present, even unlawfully; the latter are plainly protected by due 
process, while "certain constitutional protections available to persons inside 
the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic 
borders.,,74 
70 Id. at 690. 
71 Id. (quoting government's brief). 
72 Id. at 691. 
73 Id. at 691-92. 
74 /d. at 693. 
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Significantly, even dissenting Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
intimated that immigration detention would be constitutional only where the 
alien either poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community. Justice 
Kennedy wrote that: 
[B]oth removable and inadmissible aliens are entitled to be free from 
detention that is arbitrary or capricious. Where detention is incident 
to removal, the detention cannot be justified as punishment nor can 
the confinement or its conditions be designed in order to punish. 
This accords with international views on detention of refugees and 
asylum seekers. It is neither arbitrary nor capricious to detain the 
aliens when necessary to avoid the risk of flight or danger to the 
. 75 
commumty. 
Thus, Justice Kennedy suggests that detention of aliens, even inadmissible 
aliens, where not "necessary to avoid the risk of flight or danger to the 
<;:ommunity," would violate due process. 
Litigation challenging immigration detention has often focused on whether 
a given immigrant's right to liberty is "fundamental," triggering strict scrutiny 
under substantive due process, or something less than fundamental, and 
therefore triggering less demanding review. For example, in reviewing the 
constitutionality of a 1996 law requiring mandatory detention of all aliens 
charged as deportable for certain criminal offenses, two courts of appeals have 
treated the right to liberty as a fundamental right,76 while two others have not.77 
But significantly, all four courts unanimously concluded that the imposition of 
mandatory detention violated due process. The "fundamental right" debate is 
unnecessary, in my view, because the general principles enunciated in the 
cases above do not turn on levels of scrutiny, but apply across the board as the 
minimal requirements for any constitutional civil detention scheme. Relying 
on these principles, the Supreme Court has resolved most of its civil detention 
cases without specifying whether the right to physical liberty is fundamental. 78 
And as Justice Kennedy's dissent in Zadvydas illustrates, even under relaxed 
scrutiny, preventive detention in the absence of evidence of flight risk or 
75 Id. at 721 (Kennedy. J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
76 Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002), petition/or cert. filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3698 
(U.S. May 3, 2002) (No. 01-1616); Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2001). 
77 Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 530 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2696 (2002); Welch v. 
Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 221 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting view that right to liberty pending a final removal order 
is a fundamental right); id. at 228 (Widener, J., concurring in the judgment). 
78 See. e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678; Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 
U.S. 71 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987). 
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danger is arbitrary, capricious, and unconstitutiona1.79 In this area of the law, 
levels of scrutiny are not particularly illuminating. I have sought to avoid that 
thicket, and instead have sought to identify the basic due process principles 
that the Court has applied to civil detention in all settings. 
The immigration cases reviewed here illustrate that immigration detention 
is governed by the same due process principles that regulate other forms of 
civil preventive detention. Thus, immigration detention may not be used for 
punitive purposes and must be based on a showing by the government, in a fair 
adversarial proceeding, that the alien poses either a risk of flight or a danger to 
the community. These are fairly basic principles, yet as will be shown below, 
they call into question many recent developments in immigration law. 
B. The Principles Applied 
1. Mandatory Detention 
Until relatively recently, immigration detention was generally consistent 
with the above principles. Prior to its amendment in 1996, the INA delegated 
what appeared to be open-ended discretion to the Attorney General to deny 
bail to aliens in deportation proceedings and for six months after their 
proceedings concluded with a final order of deportation.8o However, the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had long interpreted that statutory grant of 
discretion to conform to due process requirements, holding that aliens should 
not be detained unless they posed either a risk of flight or a danger to the 
national security.81 The BIA did not explain its interpretation as driven by 
constitutional concerns, but absent those constitutional concerns, it is difficult 
to see what justification the BIA had for reading into an open-ended grant of 
discretion the specific requirements that the government establish flight risk or 
danger. Prior to 1996, virtually identical statutory language governed 
79 Zadvydas, 533 U.s. at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
80 Before its amendment in 1996,8 U.S.c. § 1252(a) (1994) provided that any alien taken into custody 
"pending a determination of deportability ... may, in the discretion of the Attorney General and pending such 
final determination of deportability, (A) be continued in c.ustody; or (B) be released under bond ... ; or (C) be 
released on conditional parole." 8 U.S.c. § 1252(a)(2) (1994). A companion provision governing detention 
once a deportation order became final and executable used virtually identical language. Id. § 1252(c). 
81 The Board interpreted 8 U.S.c. § 1252(a) (1994) to require release of the alien unless "he is a threat to 
the national security or ... a poor bail risk." In re Patel, 15 l. & N. Dec. 666, 666 (B.l.A. 1976) (citation 
omitted); see also O'Rourke v. Warden, 539 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[A]n alien should be 
detained or required to post a bond, only if he is a threat to national security or is a poor bail risk.") (internal 
quotation marks omitted); In re Drysdale, 20 l. & N. Dec. 815, 817 (B.LA. 1994) ("Once it is determined that 
an alien does not present a danger to the community or any bail risk, then no bond should be required."). 
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detention after a deportation order became executable, and therefore this 
provision also appeared to limit detention to situations where the alien proved 
a flight risk or a danger. Under that statute, it had long been the rule that-
before or after a final order of deportation-aliens living here could be 
detained only where there was a "reasonable foundation" that they were either 
a flight risk or a danger to the community.82 
In 1996, however, Congress amended the INA's detention provisions. It 
imposed mandatory detention on certain criminal aliens while they were in 
pending deportation proceedings,83 and appeared to require mandatory 
detention of all aliens subject to executable removal orders, at least for ninety 
days.84 Both of these provisions raise serious constitutional problems because 
they require detention even where there is no need for preventive detention, 
that is, where the alien is neither a risk of flight nor a danger to the community. 
Four courts of appeals have struck down the provision imposing mandatory 
detention on criminal aliens, at least in some respect, and the Supreme Court 
has agreed to review the issue.85 The appellate court decisions follow directly 
from Zadvydas and the Court's general jurisprudence on civil detention. If 
aliens finally ordered deported have a liberty interest in being free of physical 
custody, a fortiori aliens who have only been charged as deportable have at 
least as strong a liberty interest.86 There is no doubt that Congress may 
authorize the detention of aliens pending removal proceedings who pose a risk 
of flight or a danger to the community. But mandatory detention provisions by 
82 See Bartholomeu v. District Director. 487 F. Supp. 315, 321 (D. Md. 1980) (holding that decision to 
detain alien after final order of deportation is entered is subject to habeas review for abuse of discretion, and 
that discretion is abused if the detention is "without reasonable foundation"); United States ex rei. Daniman v. 
Shaughnessy, 117 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (ordering release of alien subject to final order of 
deportation where there was no reasonable foundation for the claim that he was a risk of flight); see also 
United States ex reI. Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir. 1974) (habeas should be granted 
where INS detains aliens "without reasonable foundation"); Danh v. Demore, 59 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1002 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999) ("Under an abuse of discretion standard, the Attorney General's decision to deny bond can always 
be reversed if it is arbitrary or erroneous."). But cf AI Najjar v. Ashcroft, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242 (S.D. 
Aa. 2002) (holding that 8 U.S.c. § 1252(c) (\995) gives Attorney General unfettered discretion to detain 
aliens under final deportation orders for six months, without regard to whether the alien poses a danger to the 
community or a flight risk). 
83 8 U.S.C. § I 226(c) (2000). 
84 [d. § 1231 (a)(\ )(A). 
85 Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 538-39 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. grallled sub nom. Demore v. Kim, 122 S. 
Ct. 2696 (2002); Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 227 (4th Cir. 2002); Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 
1260 (10th Cir. 2002); Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 314 (3d Cir. 2001); Radoncic v. Zemski, 28 Fed. Appx. 
113, 116 (3d Cir. 2001). 
86 See Kim, 276 F.3d at 535. 
HeinOnline -- 51 Emory L.J. 1023 2002
2002] DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON IMMIGRATION DETENTION 1023 
definition impose preventive detention even where there is nothing to prevent. 
The fundamental flaw in the mandatory detention scheme is that it eliminates 
any individualized determination of whether a given alien poses a danger or 
flight risk.8? 
The government makes three arguments in defending mandatory detention. 
It first contends that Zadvydas's due process analysis does not apply here, 
because in Zadvydas, the Court confronted the possibility of "indefinite" 
detention, whereas the provision imposing detention pending removal 
proceedings terminates when the removal order becomes final. 88 But the Court 
has applied the same general due process analysis to all preventive detention, 
including preventive detention that is likely to be much more short-lived than 
that imposed on aliens in removal proceedings. In Salerno, for example, the 
Bail Reform Act provided for civil detention only until the criminal trial, 
which under speedy trial requirements is generally a brief period. Detention 
while removal proceedings and appeals therefrom are pending can and often 
does last for years. 89 
Second, the government argues that it is more efficient to detain all 
criminal aliens, as many criminal aliens flee to avoid deportation. It cites a 
study finding that the INS failed to deport eighty-nine percent of non-detained 
aliens ordered deported, while the INS was able to remove almost ninety-four 
percent of detained aliens who were ordered deported.9o But as one court put 
it, a ninety percent failure to appear rate does not justify imprisoning the ten 
percent of aliens "who would dutifully report to proceedings," because 
detaining the ten percent "furthers no government goal.,,91 Bail hearings 
87 Id. at 533-34; Hoang, 282 F.3d at 1259-60. 
88 Pet. for Cert. at 13-14, Demore v. Kim, 122 S. Ct. 2696 (2002) (No. 01-1491). The detention itself 
does not terminate in most cases, because under a separate provision of 8 U.S.c. § 1231, aliens subject to final 
removal orders are subject to an automatic 90-day detention, and criminal aliens may be subject to further 
detention thereafter. 8 U.S.c. § 1231(a)(I)(A), (a)(6). The government's argument is that technically 
detention pursuant to 8 U.s.c. § 1226(c) is not indefinite. 
89 For example, Mazen Al Najjar spent three and one-half years detained pending final resolution of his 
deportation hearings. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335 (\ Ith Cir. 2001). Nasser Ahmed similarly 
spent three and one-half years in detention pending resolution of his deportation hearings. David Cole, 
Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 1.L. & RELIGION 267, 273 (2000/2001). I 
represented both Mr. Al Najjar and Mr. Ahmed. 
90 Pet. for Cert. at 16, DeMore (No. OI-1491)(citing OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, INSPECTION REPORT, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS AFTER 
FINAL ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED (1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oigli9603/i9603.htm). 
91 Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 312 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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routinely assess risk of flight; where aliens pose no such risk, no legitimate 
purpose is served by their detention. 
Finally, the government maintains that the Court should defer to 
Congress's plenary power over deportation.92 But as illustrated above, the 
Court has not deferred on questions of the procedures used to effectuate 
deportation, even while it has deferred with respect to the substantive grounds 
for exclusion and deportation. Moreover, even granting the government 
plenary power over who may remain and who shall be removed, individualized 
hearings focused on danger and flight risk would fully permit the government 
to detain wherever necessary in aid of removal. The mandatory detention 
provision, by contrast, imposes detention even where detention is wholly 
unnecessary to removal. There is no reason to defer to such legislation, just as 
there was no reason to defer to Congress's imposition of imprisonment at hard 
labor in Wong Wing. 
The 1996 provision imposing mandatory detention once an alien is ordered 
removed also offends due process for many of the same reasons. Title 8 of the 
U.S. Code § 1231(a)(2) somewhat contradictorily requires that all aliens 
ordered removed be detained during the ninety-day removal period, but further 
provides that "under no circumstance during the removal period shall the 
Attorney General release an alien who has been found inadmissible . . . or 
deportable [on specified grounds]." The latter proviso seems to suggest, at 
least by negative implication, that detention during the removal period is not in 
fact mandatory for any but those aliens falling into the category who may not 
be released under any circumstance. But to the extent that this statute imposes 
mandatory detention on any aliens who pose neither a flight risk nor a danger, 
it furthers no legitimate immigration purpose, and is unconstitutional. While it 
may well be true that many aliens ordered removed would be likely to flee to 
avoid deportation, where an alien does not in fact pose that risk and does not 
present any danger to the community, his detention is not even rationally 
related to removal, for it is wholly unnecessary to effectuate the alien's 
departure. 
One court has recently interpreted Zadvydas to authorize as a constitutional 
matter six months of post-removal order detention "regardless of whether the 
alien presents a danger to the community or a risk of flight.,,93 But that 
92 Pet. for Cert. at 14-18, DeMore (No. 01-1491). 
93 Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 2002). Judge Williams, concurring in a 
mandatory detention case, similarly reasoned that Zadvydas adopted a presumption that six months of pre-
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conclusion misreads Zadvydas's imposition of a six-month limit on detention 
as a six-month automatic authorization of detention even where there is no 
need for detention. The Supreme Court in Zadvydas held that post-removal 
order detention is limited to six months, even where an alien poses a danger to 
the community. As the Court stated its holding, "[i]n our view, the statute, read 
in light of the Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-removal-period 
detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal 
from the United States.,,94 
Both of the aliens before the Court in Zadvydas-Kestutis Zadvydas and 
Kim Ho Ma-had been determined by the INS to require detention because 
they were dangerous.95 Neither Zadvydas nor Ma challenged those 
determinations in the Supreme Court. Rather, they argued that, even assuming 
they were dangerous, they could not be detained indefinitely if they could not 
be removed. The Supreme Court agreed. But that conclusion in no way 
suggests that if Zadvydas and Ma were not dangerous or a flight risk, they 
could nonetheless be detained for six months. 
In fact, the Zadvydas Court specifically directed that habeas courts 
reviewing the legality of any post-removal-order detention "should consider 
the risk of the alien's committing further crimes" and "the statute's basic 
purpose, namely, assuring the alien's presence at the moment of removal.,,96 
Similarly, as noted above, dissenting Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, suggested that detention of aliens who posed neither a 
flight risk nor a danger would be arbitrary, capricious, and unconstitutiona1.97 
removal detention is reasonable even without a showing that the alien poses a danger or flight risk. Welch v. 
Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 234 (4th Cir. 2002) (Williams, J., concurring). 
94 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Oliveros, 
275 F.3d 1299, 1308 n.6 (11 th Cir. 2001) (noting that Zadvydas imposed a "presumptive limit" of six months 
on post-removal order detention). 
95 See Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 284 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that INS determined that 
Zadvydas was "a threat to security as well as a flight risk"); Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(noting that the INS detained Ma because it could not conclude that Ma would "remain nonviolent" if 
released). 
96 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 699. 
97 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority in Zadvydas did set a six month 
maximum as a presumptively reasonable period of detention, but it did so only with respect to aliens deemed 
dangerous or a risk of flight, in order to mitigate the "difficult judgments" involved in assessing "the 
Government's foreign policy judgments, including, for example the status of repatriation negotiations .... " 
[d. at 700. The "difficult jUdgments" to which the Supreme Court referred concerned the complexity of 
foreign negotiations over repatriation, not the entirely familiar judicial assessment of whether an individual 
poses a flight risk or a danger to the community, inquiries that the Court expressly directed habeas courts to 
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Under the Court's due process jurisprudence, any mandatory detention 
provision is likely to be invalid, because preventive detention at a minimum 
requires an individualized finding, after a fair hearing, that the individual poses 
a risk that warrants prevention. By definition, mandatory detention statutes 
deny individualized treatment and deny any hearing, much less a fair one. 
Because the government's legitimate interests in detention can be served by a 
process of individualized hearings, mandatory detention statutes should be 
invalid. As the decision in Salerno illustrates, mandatory preventive detention 
in the criminal setting would plainly violate due process; as the liberty interests 
and the government's interests are identical in the immigration setting, it 
should also violate due process there. 
2. The USA PATRIOT Act: Detention by Certification 
Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act also raises serious due process 
concerns. It gives the Attorney General new power to detain aliens without a 
hearing and without a showing that they pose a danger or a flight risk. He need 
only certify that he has "reasonable grounds to believe" that the alien is 
"described in" various anti-terrorism provisions of the INA, and the alien is 
then subject to potentially indefinite detention.98 The INA's anti-terrorism 
provisions in turn include persons who are mere members of designated 
"terrorist organizations,,,99 persons who have supported only the lawful 
activities of such organizations, 100 and persons who have used, or threatened to 
use, any weapon with intent to endanger person or property.lOl Thus, the law 
defines as a terrorist subject to unilateral executive detention a permanent 
resident alien who the INS has reasonable grounds to believe threatened her 
husband with a kitchen knife in a domestic dispute. Surely all such persons do 
not pose a danger or flight risk necessitating preventive detention, but the USA 
PATRIOT Act empowers the Attorney General to detain them without any 
showing that they in fact pose a danger or flight risk. 
The detention provision authorizes the INS to detain aliens without any 
charges whatsoever for seven days. This is a curious provision in several 
undertake. Zadvydas merely sets a presumptive outside limit on how long the INS may detain aliens subject to 
final deportation orders who pose a danger but cannot be deported. 
98 USA PATRIOT Act. Pub. L. No. 107-56. 115 Stat. 272 § 412(a)(3) (2001) (amending 8 U.S.c. 
§ I 226A(a) (Supp. 2002». 
99 8 U.S.C. § I I 82(a)(3)(B)(i)(V) (2001). 
100 See id. §§ I I 82(a)(3)(B)(vi). I 227(a)(4)(B). 
101 8 U.S.c. § I I 82(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) (2002). 
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respects. First, since the Attorney General must have reasonable grounds to 
believe that an alien is inadmissible or deportable before he can invoke this 
authority, it is not clear what purpose is served by permitting the alien to be 
held without charges for seven days. The Attorney General ought to be able to 
charge the alien with the provision he has reasonable grounds to believe that 
the alien has violated. The only possible purpose of delaying such a charging 
document for seven days would be to keep him from an immigration judge 
who could review the legality of the detention and entertain a request for 
release on bond. But it is difficult to imagine any legitimate purpose that such 
a delay could further. 
Moreover, the authority to detain for seven days appears to be directly 
contrary to the Supreme Court's holding that the Fourth Amendment requires 
that persons arrested be brought before a judge promptly, and presumptively 
within forty-eight hours, for a probable cause hearing. 102 The Fourth 
Amendment applies to persons living in the United States, including aliens, 103 
and an arrest for immigration purposes is just as much a seizure as an arrest for 
criminal law purposes. While County of Riverside permits the government to 
show that a delay of more than forty-eight hours in getting a detainee before a 
judge was reasonable under extraordinary circumstances, the PATRIOT Act 
grants blanket authority to detain for seven days without charges anytime the 
Attorney General decides to certify. This aspect of the provision is almost 
certainly unconstitutional. 
The PATRIOT Act does provide for habeas corpus review of the Attorney 
General's certification decision. I04 But the scope of that review will un-
doubtedly be the subject of considerable dispute. The government is almost 
certain to argue that the habeas court is restricted to asking whether the 
Attorney General had any basis for his belief, based solely on the evidence 
available to him at the time of certification, and that the court has no authority 
to ascertain whether in fact the alien falls within the specified grounds of 
inadmissibility or removability.105 If courts accept that view, the alien would 
have no opportunity to present contradictory evidence, but would be limited to 
102 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). 
103 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Rhoden v. United States, 55 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 1995). 
104 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 § 412(a)(3) (2001) (amending 8 U.S.C. 
§ I 226A(a) (Supp. 2002)). 
105 The government has successfully argued for such a deferential standard in connection with denials of 
admission. See Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643 (lst Cir. 1990). 
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challenging the sufficiency of the government's record. Such a process would 
afford the alien no meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
Even if the habeas corpus review is more searching, and the courts 
conclude that their task is to ascertain whether there are in fact "reasonable 
grounds to believe" that the alien is deportable or inadmissible on terrorism-
related grounds, the statute does not require that the alien pose either a danger 
to the community or a risk of flight, the only grounds upon which preventive 
detention has ever been sustained. 106 The government might argue that any 
alien certified as deportable or inadmissible on terrorist grounds would by 
definition pose a danger to the community, but given the breadth of the INA's 
terrorism grounds, that view is not sustainable. A woman who once 
brandished a knife in a domestic dispute is not necessarily a danger to the 
community, nor is a person who has done nothing more than provide 
humanitarian aid to an organization that our government considers "terrorist." 
The PATRIOT Act provision applies both during removal proceedings, 
which can last years, and after removal proceedings have concluded. Indeed, it 
appears to authorize indefinite detention of some aliens even where they have 
prevailed in their removal proceedings. It provides that detention shall be 
maintained "irrespective of ... any relief from removal granted the alien, until 
the Attorney General determines that the alien is no longer an alien who may 
be certified .... ,,107 But an alien who has been granted relief from removal 
may not be removed. An alien granted asylum, for example, has a legal right 
to live in the United States. At that point, the INS has no legitimate basis for 
detaining the individual, as detention certainly is not in aid of removal where 
removal itself is unauthorized. 108 
106 The statute does require the Attorney General to make such a showing each time he seeks to extend the 
detention by six-month increments. but requires no such showing for the initial six-month period. See 8 
U.S.C. § I 226A(a)(7) (Supp. 2002). 
107 8 U.S.c. § 1226A(a)(2) (2001). amended by USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56. 115 Stat. 272 
§ 412 (2001). 
108 Zadvydas v. Davis. 533 U.S. 678, 702 (2001) (holding that the INS could not detain indefinitely even 
aliens finally determined to be deportable where there was no reasonable likelihood that they could by 
deported). The Court in Zadvydas reserved for another day the legality of indefinite detention of a deportable 
alien where applied "narrowly to 'a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals,' say suspected 
terrorists." [d. at 691 (citation omitted). But the PATRIOT Act's definition of who may be detained is not 
limited to a narrow, "small segment of dangerous individuals," as the Zadvydas Court contemplated. but 
applies to garden-variety criminals, barroom brawlers. and those who have supported no violent activity 
whatsoever, but have merely provided humanitarian support to a disfavored group. 
The standard for the Attorney General's certification raises additional constitutional concerns. The Act 
authorizes potentially indefinite detention whenever the Attorney General has "reasonable grounds to believe" 
that an alien falls within one of the specified grounds of deportation or inadmissibility. 8 U.S.c. 
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3. Detention After Deportation or Voluntary Departure is Possible 
As the stories that opened this article illustrate, since September 11 the INS 
has adopted a policy and practice of holding deportable aliens well beyond the 
time necessary to effectuate their departure simply because the FBI has not yet 
completed its investigation of them. Aliens who have agreed to leave and have 
been granted voluntary departure or a final order of removal, and who are fully 
ready to leave, have been detained for months longer, until the FBI has 
"cleared" them. This practice plainly violates due process, for once removal 
can be effected, any further custody cannot be said to be in aid of removal. 
The INS has no freestanding authority to detain persons, but may do so only in 
aid of removal. Custody maintained long after removal could be effected is 
not incident to the INS's removal of the alien, but incident to the FBI's 
investigation of the individual. But neither the FBI nor the INS has any 
authority to detain people simply for investigation. 
The Constitution does not permit investigative detention. If the FBI 
suspects that an individual may be guilty of a crime, it cannot arrest her, 
investigate, and then release her only after it has convinced itself that she is 
innocent. Rather, the law presumes that she is innocent, and permits her arrest 
only if the FBI obtains objective information establishing probable cause to 
believe that she has in fact committed a crime. 109 Moreover, it must justify any 
arrest within forty-eight hours by making a probable cause showing before an 
independent judge. 110 Yet in the Justice Department' s post-September 11 
detention campaign, the government held many immigrants for months after 
they could have been deported, solely for investigative purposes, without 
establishing to anyone that there was probable cause to believe that they had 
committed a crime. 
Such detention violates substantive due process because it furthers no 
legitimate government interest. It also violates procedural due process, be-
§ 1226A(a)(3). If that standard is interpreted as requiring anything less than probable cause, the constitutional 
minimum required for an arrest, it would likely be unconstitutional. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, III 
(1975). Moreover, even probable cause is not constitutionally sufficient to justify preventive pretrial detention 
absent a separate and additional finding that the individual poses either a 'riskof flight or a threat to the 
community. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,752-53 (1987). 
109 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976) (upholding arrest in public place on probable 
cause); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112 (requiring prompt probable cause hearing before independent judge for any 
arrest). 
1 \0 County of Riverside v. Mclaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (requiring government to bring detainee 
before independent judge for probable cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest, absent extraordinary circum-
stances). 
HeinOnline -- 51 Emory L.J. 1030 2002
1030 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51 
cause the aliens were afforded no hearing on detention and were not 
detennined to be dangerous in any proceeding. 
4. Automatic Stays 
It appears that in the wake of September 11, most immigration judges 
hearing cases of aliens detained in connection with the investigation of those 
attacks denied bond to the aliens before them. But apparently some 
immigration judges ruled that aliens should be released, finding insufficient 
evidence that the aliens posed a risk of flight or a threat to the community. On 
October 29, 2001, therefore, the Attorney General issued a new regulation 
authorizing INS District Directors-the "prosecutors" in removal proceedings 
-to effectively overrule, at least temporarily, an immigration judge who 
orders the release of an alien in proceedings before her. III The District 
Director can block the alien's release simply by filing an appeal to the BIA of 
the judge's release order. The appeal has the effect of automatically staying 
the release order while the matter is on appeal. It does so no matter how 
frivolous the appeal is, and without any requirement that the District Director 
meet the usual standards for a stay pending appeal, such as likelihood of 
success and irreparable harm. I 12 Appeals of immigration custody decisions 
routinely take months and often more than a year to decide. Yet the automatic 
stay provision imposes no time limit on the BIA decision process. 
Like the mandatory detention statute, the automatic stay provlSlon 
authorizes the detention of aliens who pose no flight risk or danger to the 
community. Indeed, by definition it applies only where an immigration judge, 
having considered all the evidence, specifically finds that the alien can be 
released on bond because he poses no flight risk or danger warranting 
detention. Thus, it will result in the detention only of individuals found not to 
need preventive detention. 
As with mandatory detention, the government has a legitimate interest 
here-immigration judges sometimes err, and the government has an interest 
in not letting an alien go free who in fact poses a threat or a flight risk, despite 
an immigration judge's finding to the contrary. But the INS was always able 
to seek stays pending appeal of release orders. In doing so, however, the INS 
had to show that it was likely to succeed on its appeal and would suffer 
III 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(4)(i)(2) (2002). See Review of Custody Determinations, 66 Fed. Reg. 54909 (Oct. 31, 
2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.3). 
112 [d. 
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irreparable harm in the meantime. Where it can make such a showing, a stay is 
warranted. But the automatic stay provision authorizes stays without any such 
showing, and even when it is undisputed that no such showing could be made. 
That power is clearly excessive in relation to the government's legitimate 
purposes, and therefore violates due process. 
The government's notice regarding the regulatory amendment explained 
that the change was designed in part to avoid the necessity for last-minute 
expedited briefing where an alien has been ordered released and the 
government seeks to stay her release. 113 But that interest could plainly be met 
by authorizing a seven-day temporary stay of release orders merely for 
purposes of allowing the BIA to decide whether to grant a full stay pending 
appeal. Instead, the regulation takes the stay decision out of the hands of the 
judges altogether and gives it to the prosecutor who has by definition failed to 
persuade a judge in an adversary hearing that detention is justified. 114 
5. The Entering Aliens Exception 
The above analysis addresses the rights of aliens who have entered the 
country, whether legally or not, and who as a result are indisputably protected 
by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. For at least a century, the 
Supreme Court has held that aliens who have entered the country are entitled to 
due process. 115 But the status of aliens outside our borders and seeking to enter 
has been seen as starkly different. The Supreme Court's discussion in 
Zadvydas v. Davis captures the prevailing view: 
The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the 
United States and one who has never entered runs throughout 
immigration law. It is well established that certain constitutional 
protections available to persons inside the United States are 
unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders. But once an 
alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due 
Process Clause applies to all "persons" within the United States, 
113 Review of Custody Determinations. 66 Fed. Reg. 54909,54911 (Oct. 31,2001). 
114 One court has held the automatic stay provision unconstitutional, concluding that without a reasonable 
time frame on resolution of appeals, "the automatic stay suffers from the same constitutional infirmities as 
mandatory detention .... " Almonte-Vargas v. Elwood, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12387, at *19 (E.D. Pa. June 
28, 2002). In that case, the INS invoked the automatic stay to block release of a criminal alien who had been 
ordered released after an individualized bond hearing required by the Third Circuit's decision declaring 
mandatory detention of criminal aliens unconstitutional. 
115 See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86,100-01 (1903). 
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including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, 
116 temporary, or permanent. 
[Vol. 51 
The Zadvydas Court advanced this distinction between aliens inside and 
outside our borders as its rationale for rejecting the government's reliance on 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex reI. Mezei. 117 As noted above, in Zadvydas 
the Fifth Circuit had adopted the government's argument that an alien subject 
to a final order of deportation has essentially the same legal status as an alien 
seeking initial entry, and therefore is not constitutionally entitled to due 
process. 118 The Supreme Court invoked the "well established" distinction 
between aliens seeking to enter and aliens already here to dismiss that 
argument, finding that even aliens finally ordered deported retain a liberty 
interest in being free of physical custody that triggers due process protection. 
But while the distinction between excludable and deportable aliens is 
certainly well established, there is good reason to question it, at least as regards 
detention. The argument rests on a right-privilege distinction that, whether or 
not it is justified with respect to entry, ought not fairly extend to involuntary 
custody. The rationale for the distinction is probably best illustrated by United 
States ex reI. Knauff v. Shaughnessy. I 19 In that case, the Court upheld the 
exclusion of a German war bride on the basis of secret evidence. Relying on 
the right-privilege distinction, the Court reasoned that Knauff had no legal 
right to enter, and therefore was requesting a privilege. As a result, the Court 
reasoned, she could not challenge the procedures used to exclude her, for 
"[ w ]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as 
I· d . d' d ,,120 an a len eme entry IS concerne . 
This decision is often loosely cited for the proposition that aliens outside 
our borders have no constitutional rightS. 121 But upon closer reading, it stands 
for a much narrower proposition, one by no means unique to immigration law. 
The Court has often held that where a person has no right to a given benefit, he 
has no protected property or liberty interest in that benefit, and therefore due 
process does not restrict the procedures the government uses to allocate it. For 
116 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (internal citations omitted). See generally David A. Martin, Graduated 
Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of ZLldvydas v Davis, 200 I SUP. CT. 
REV. 47. 
117 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
118 Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1999). 
119 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
120 /d. at 544. 
121 See, e.g., Guzman v. Tippy, 130 F.3d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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this reason, inmates cannot object on due process grounds to denials of 
discretionary pardon or parole. 12 On this view, Knauff does not stand for the 
sweeping proposition that aliens beyond our borders have no rights, or even no 
due process rights, but establishes only the narrower claim that because non-
citizens have no liberty or property interest in entry they have no right to object 
to the procedures used to exclude them. Indeed, the Court has subsequently 
described Knauff in precisely those terms, describing it as holding that "an 
alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has 
no constitutional rights regarding his application . ... ,,]23 
The Court in Mezei relied almost exclusively on Knauff, but in so doing it 
appears to have extended that decision beyond its rationale. At issue in Knauff 
was simply the procedure used to determine her admissibility. But Mezei 
challenged both the denial of entry and his potentially indefinite detention. 
Virtually without analysis, the Mezei Court extended the right-privilege 
distinction that governed in Knauff to the distinct issue of indefinite detention. 
No country would take Mezei back, and he had been detained on Ellis Island 
for nearly two years before he obtained his release on a petition for habeas 
cOrpUS. 124 The Court first found that, like Knauff, Mezei had no due process 
right to object to the procedures used to deny him entry. It then turned to what 
it euphemistically called the issue of Mezei's "continued exclusion on Ellis 
Island.,,125 It characterized his indefinite detention as itself a gratuitous 
benefit, because the government could "keep entrants by sea aboard the vessel 
pending determination of their admissibility .... ,,126 As such, it concluded 
that Mezei's "temporary harborage, an act of legislative grace, bestows no 
additional rights" upon him.127 In effect, the Court used the "entry fiction" to 
122 See. e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 
248-49 (1983) (holding that state prison regulations did not create a liberty interest implicated by a transfer to 
another state); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466-67 (1981) (ruling that neither a 
state statute empowering the Board of Pardons to commute sentences nor the Board's practice of commuting 
three-fourths of life sentences created a liberty interest requiring due process in review of applications for 
commutation); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976) (finding that prison inmates had no liberty interest 
implicated in being transferred to another prison); Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 
(1972) (holding that an untenured professor had no property interest in being rehired and therefore no due 
process objection to the procedures used to reach that decision); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286,1300 (11th Cir. 
1999) (finding that various actions taken by the INS to encourage aliens to apply for suspension of deportation 
did not create a liberty interest protected by due process). 
123 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (emphasis added). 
124 United States ex reI. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 195 F.2d 964, 965 (2d Cir. 1952). 
125 Shaughnessy v. United States ex reI. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953). 
126 [d. 
127 [d. 
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transform Mezei from an indefinitely detained alien with no place to go into an 
alien continuously knocking at the gate, challenging his denial of entry. 128 
It is one thing to say that due process does not apply to the denial of a 
gratuitous benefit; it is another matter entirely to say that due process does not 
apply when the government has deprived a human being of her physical 
liberty. As Justice Jackson stated in dissent in Mezei, 
Realistically, this man is incarcerated by a combination of forces 
which keep him as effectually as a prison, the dominant and 
proximate of these forces being the United States immigration 
authority. It overworks legal fiction to say that one is free in law 
when by the commonest of common sense he is bound. 129 
Mezei was confined because our government refused to parole him while his 
admissibility was being determined, and because no other country would 
accept him back. In the most literal sense, the government was depriving him 
of his liberty. In that setting, one need not ask whether the extension of a 
benefit gives rise to a statutorily created liberty or property interest, because 
128 Most courts have subsequently read Mezei to establish the broad proposition that excludable aliens 
have no due process rights vis-a-vis the decision to detain or parole them. See. e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. 
Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1449-50 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting argument that Mezei involved only exclusion, and 
finding that it upheld the legality of his detention); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 969-70 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(concluding that under Mezei, aliens cannot claim equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment); Palma 
v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 103 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that Mezei stands for the proposition that "indefinite 
detention of a permanently excluded alien deemed to be a security risk, who is refused entry to other countries, 
is not unlawful"). Many courts have, like the Court in Mezei, treated the question of detention versus release 
as involving only a privilege, not a right. See. e.g., Gisbert v. U.s. Attorney General, 988 F.2d 1437, 1443 (5th 
Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986); Jeanty v. Bulger, 204 F. Supp. 2d 
1366, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (finding that because "neither detention nor parole affects their legal status as 
excludable aliens," aliens requesting parole "have no constitutional rights with regard to their [parole] 
applications"). 
Some courts, however, have held that excludable aliens retain certain due process rights regarding their 
physical liberty. Thus, in Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 399 (3d Cir. 1999), the Third Circuit held that excludable 
aliens who could not be removed were entitled, as a matter of due process, to periodic review of the necessity 
for their continued detention. The Tenth Circuit in Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 
(10th Cir. 1981), held that as detention of excludable aliens becomes indefinite, it would be viewed as 
"impermissible punishment rather than detention pending deportation." On this view, excludable aliens at a 
minimum enjoy the Wong Wing due process right not to be punished without a criminal trial. And the Fifth 
Circuit has held that excludable aliens have a due process right to object to intentionally abusive detention 
conditions. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th Cir. 1987). The latter decisions in particular seem 
intuitively correct-surely if the government began shooting those who arrived at our shores without proper 
papers the courts would not find that the aliens had no due process right to object to such treatment. Thus, 
Mezei cannot literally mean that aliens outside our borders seeking entry have no constitutional right to assert 
regarding how they are treated in the admission process. 
129 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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the liberty interest in being free of physical custody derives directly from the 
Constitution itself. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[f]reedom from bodily 
restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause .... ,,130 Whenever the government takes an individual into custody, it 
should have to comply with due process. 
Moreover, the conclusion that due process extends to detention should not 
be limited by geographical concerns. When our government takes an 
individual into custody, it is imposing its will and authority on that person. It 
demands that the detained person remain in custody pursuant to its legal 
authority. But its legal authority is in tum constrained by the Constitution. 13 I 
Thus, if the United States seeks to try a U.S. citizen abroad, it must extend 
constitutional protections to that person. 132 By the same token, outside of 
wartime, when separate rules may apply to citizens and aliens alike,133 where 
the federal government imposes its authority on a noncitizen by depriving her 
of liberty, it must afford her due process, since the protections of the due 
process clause extend to all persons. 
The Supreme Court's conclusion that Mezei's "temporary harborage" at 
Ellis Island did not give him any "additional rights" therefore missed the point. 
It is reasonable to decline to allow such harborage to act as a bootstrap, giving 
the alien rights with respect to entry that he would not otherwise enjoy if 
stopped at the border and turned away. But it does not ~ollow that he has no 
130 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). See also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) 
(quoting Foucha). As a result, "commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty 
that requires due process protection." Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (emphasis added); see also United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) ("In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without 
trial is the carefully limited exception."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("Without doubt, 
[liberty] denotes ... freedom from bodily restraint .... "). 
I31 GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND 
FuNDAMENTAL LAW 108-17 (1996) (arguing for "mutuality of obligation" theory of constitutional rights, 
extending rights where we choose to impose federal legal obligations). 
132 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,5 (1957) (holding that civilians cannot be tried in military courts that lack 
constitutional protections associated with criminal trial). 
133 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 772 (1950) (holding that enemy aliens captured on the 
battlefield abroad cannot seek habeas corpus claiming violations of constitutional rights, but limiting its 
holding to "enemy aliens" during wartime, noting that power to detain enemy aliens is "an incident of war and 
not ... an incident of alienage"); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I (1942) (upholding use of military tribunal to try 
foreign nationals and U.S. citizen accused of fighting for Germany and violating the laws of war during World 
War II). 
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right to object to the process by which he was deprived of his liberty once 
stopped. 134 
In its brief to the Supreme Court in Mezei, the government argued that the 
issue of whether due process limited Mezei's detention was indistinguishable 
from whether due process limited his exclusion, because an order releasing 
him would for all practical purposes constitute an entry.135 But under the 
"entry fiction" doctrine, an alien granted temporary "parole" into the United 
States at large is treated as if he were still at the border for purposes of 
assessing his ultimate admissibility.136 Thus, whether an alien is literally 
outside the country, detained in the country, or at large in the country has no 
legal effect on his admission if he has not "entered." Given the existence of 
that fiction, ordering an alien released on parole is not equivalent to affording 
him entry. Although temporarily free of custody, he has no legal right to 
remain in the United States, and as soon as he can be excluded he will be. In 
addition, an alien released on parole may be subjected to reasonable releas,e 
conditions to meet the government's concerns, while an admitted alien is 
subject only to the general conditions applicable to all aliens here. Thus, the 
government's and the Court's use of the entry fiction is unpersuasive as a 
rationale for denying due process protection to an alien whom the government 
decides to hold in its custody, because releasing the alien is no more a legal 
"entry" than is holding him in custody on U.S. soil. 
This is not to say that there are no constitutional differences between the 
detention of an alien stopped at the border and the detention of an alien 
residing in the United States. First, where an entering alien is free to return to 
the country from which she came, it might be more justifiable to conclude that 
the government has not deprived her of her liberty when it holds her pending a 
134 Justice Holmes made exactly this point in a case involving detention of a person who claimed that he 
was a U.S. citizen but whom the government claimed was subject to exclusion: 
It is true that the petitioner gains no additional right of entrance by being allowed to pass the 
frontier in custody for the determination of his case. But on the question whether he is wrongly 
imprisoned we must look to the actual facts. De facto he is locked up until carried out of the 
country against his will. 
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8,12-13 (1908). 
135 See Brief for Petitioner at 3 n.2, Shaughnessy v. United States ex reI. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208 (1953) 
(No. 139) ("Although this proceeding arises on a petition for habeas corpus, it actually involves the right of an 
alien to temporary entry into the United States in the face of a determination by the Attorney General that his 
entry would impair the public interest. The order of the district court does not merely grant the respondent his 
freedom; it gives him a privilege he never possessed."). 
136 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215. 
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determination on her admission. In that setting, the alien arguably has the 
"keys to her cell," and may effect her release at any time by agreeing to return 
to her country of origin. Accordingly, one might well conclude that the 
government is not responsible for her detention. 137 But where, as in Mezei' s 
case, an entering alien has no other country to return to, or where a refugee is 
seeking asylum from her country of origin, she cannot return, and therefore has 
no "keys to her cell." Second, in the balancing approach called for by modem 
due process jurisprudence,138 an initial entrant's lack of ties to the community 
here, and the government's difficulty in obtaining substantial information 
about initial entrants from abroad, might combine to warrant less substantial 
procedural safeguards than would be required for detention of aliens residing 
here. But when the government imposes detention, it should not be able to 
sidestep the question of due process altogether by asserting that the alien has 
no liberty interests at stake. 
Thus, the exception for entering aliens announced in dicta in Zadvydas is 
founded on a false conflation of the issues of entry and detention. Where the 
government seeks not merely to deny the benefit of entry but to hold an alien 
against her will in custody, the alien's liberty has been deprived, and due 
process requires that the detention be justified by a showing, developed in a 
fair proceeding, that the alien's detention is necessary to effectuate the 
government's interest in expelling her. 
CONCLUSION 
The due process constraints on civil detention are relatively straight-
forward. Civil detention cannot be punitive. It must be accompanied by a 
hearing in which the person subject to detention is afforded a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. And it must be justified by a showing that the 
detained individual is in a pending criminal or immigration proceeding and 
poses a risk of flight or danger to the community, or is a danger in part because 
of a mental disability that impairs her ability to control her dangerous conduct. 
137 The same cannot be said of an alien in deportation proceedings, as he has a legal right to remain here 
while he pursues all of his appeals. and generally may not be deported until those appeals are fully exhausted 
or waived. 
138 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (I976) (ruling that procedural due process analysis 
must weigh the individual's interest, the government's interest, and the cost and efficacy of further procedural 
safeguards); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (finding that courts must apply Mathews balancing 
test to procedural due process claims regarding expulsion of aliens living here). 
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These are such basic principles-applicable to all nonenemy alien civil 
detention settings, no matter what level of scrutiny is applied-that it is 
surprising how often they have been transgressed since the 1996 amendments 
to the immigration law. It is as if in the anti-immigrant fervor that produced 
the 1996 immigration laws we collectively lost our moorings and forgot that 
immigration detention is preventive detention, and as such is warranted only 
when there is actually something to prevent. As this Article has demonstrated, 
a wide range of immigration initiatives since 1996, including many post-
September 11 measures, suggest that the government has lost sight of that 
basic proposition. 
Defenders of these measures have typically made three errors. First, and 
most importantly, they have confused the power to deport with the power to 
detain. The mere fact that someone has allegedly (or even concededly) 
violated the immigration law's conditions for continued residence may warrant 
placing her in deportation proceedings and deporting her if she is not eligible 
for any of the many forms of relief from removal. But it does not authorize 
detention unless detention is necessary because the alien also poses either a 
danger to the community or a flight risk. 
Second, defenders have relied on the right-privilege distinction and plenary 
power doctrine to argue that immigration detention is subject at most to very 
deferential review. But as illustrated above, the Supreme Court has applied the 
same constitutional analysis to immigration detention and to other forms of 
civil detention. With the exception of Mezei, where the Court conflated 
exclusion and detention and found no due process right at all, the Court has 
imposed the same basic due process requirements on immigration detention 
that it imposes on other civil detention. 
Third, defenders have argued that detention of entering aliens raises no 
constitutional concerns, relying on the Court's decision in Mezei. But that 
decision wrongly conflated the issues of excludability and detention. Aliens at 
the border are no less "persons" than aliens who have managed to enter the 
country, and when federal officials impose our legal obligations on them by 
locking them up, they should be bound by due process. While the due process 
calculus might differ somewhat with respect to a first-time entrant and a long-
time resident, one cannot avoid due process inquiry altogether by adopting a 
fiction that no liberty has been infringed. 
The notion that due process protects persons incarcerated by the 
government is hardly radical. Nor are the corollary propositions that absent a 
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criminal trial, the government cannot lock people up without a legitimate, 
nonpunitive reason, established in an individualized hearing. The fact that 
these propositions have such radical consequences for immigration detention 
as it is practiced today only underscores how radically disrespectful of due 
process the government's exercise of immigration authority has become. 
There are obvious reasons for these developments-the 1996 immigration 
reforms illustrated that the politics of immigration and crime is a dangerous 
mix, and the fear of another terrorist attack has led the government to exploit 
immigration law to the fullest. But precisely because our fears and our fervor 
are so intense, it is critical that we hue to the basic due process principles that 
have guided civil detention in the past. Immigration exceptionalism should 
find its limit at the point of detention. 
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